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Hungary: Soviet Forces Out and New
Policies In

felt that the USSR lost any legal grounds for their military presence in
Hungary. Hungarian and Soviet negotiators agreed on the date - 30 June
1991 - for the complete removal of Soviet forces from Hungarian
terri tory. 2

by Stephen R Bowers, James Madison University

Dr Stephen Bowers PhD spent two years from 1982 at the US Army Institute for Military
Assistance teaching Soviet affairs. He then became an Intelligence Analyst for the Department
of the Navy and later Assistant Professor of Political Science at James Madison University in
19871ecruring on Soviet and East European affairs. He has made several visits to Hungary and
is a Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army Reserves.

Efforts to remove Soviet troops from the barracks in Swlnok illustrate
some of the complexities of disengagement. A Hungarian delegation
arriving ro inspect the barracks on 14 June 1990 was turned away by Soviet
guards. Later, the local Russian commander apologised to the Hungarian
inspection team and allowed the group to enter only to inform them that
the projected date for departure from Swlnok would not be met, citing
vague 'organisational reasons'. After a public outcry about such delays, the
USSR's Southern Army Command headquarters reaffirmed the earlier
Swlnok date as well as the June 1991 national withdrawal deadline. To
meet this schedule, each day saw the departure of five or six trainloads of
Soviet personnel and equipment.
The financial aspects of the move were amongst the most difficult to
resolve. According to Hungarian-Soviet arrangements, the Soviet Southern
Army Command was required to provide a list of moveable property that
was available for purchase by Hungarian organisations. However,
Technika Foreign Trade Enterprise, the Hungarian agency responsible for
coordinating transfers complained that the Russians provided incomplete
lists and that gravel, bricks, antifreeze, lubricants, containers or used cars
promised had already gone by the time Technika arrived. Hungarian
private citizens made direct exchanges for bottles of wine and other items in
demand among the Soviet military community. The sale of between
100,000 to 200,000 tons of Soviet reserve fuels caused a special problem.
The fuel was kept in underground storage tanks at seven locations not
linked by pipelines. As the tanks did not comply with Hungarian standards
and lacked galvanised protection, they posed an environmental hazard.
Sometimes tanks contained substances that diluted the quality. Consequently, Shell refused to purchase the fuel while the Hungarian National
Defence Forces indicated that they did not want it. Throughout most of
last year, the Soviet authorities were unable to even arrange for
negotiations with the few organisations that might have bought the fuel.
Sale of Soviet military property was hampered by inadequate legal
arrangements, as well as with problems of quality control. One of the most
difficult matters was the establishment of a system whereby materials
could be moved to central locations. Hungarian representatives saw local
sales as more efficient; such sales cut out the need to transport bulky
materials. An additional problem was the requirement until last January
that sales had to be made for transferable roubles rather than the more
readily available Hungarian forints or perhaps even barter.
Given the Russian need for light structure residential buildings and
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For over forty years, the political and military policies of Hungary were tied
to those of the Soviet Union. Hungary's political revolution of the late
eighties was accomplished in a matter of months and received world media
attention. The revolution in military policy, a direct result of the country's
political transformation, went more slowly and was the focus of much less
international attention. Disengagement from the Warsaw Pact was only
the first step. Years of Soviet training, military thinking and technology
could not immediately be reversed. Nor could the nation's dependence on
Soviet-made equipment be repudiated by political decree. Hungary's
military revolution did not create a sensation but revealed much about how
the new government will treat the problems of the post-community era.
Throughout Eastern Europe today, military restructuring has emerged as
one of the key issues during the transition from Marxist-Leninist regimes to
the post-communist era. Hungary, a nation where political change
preceded that of her neighbours, set the standard for an orderly transition
from dictatorship to emergent democracy is now taking the lead in military
restructuring. Prime Minister J ozsef Antall declared some months ago that
the Warsaw Pact 'has lost its meaning under the present circumstances
. . . Our country does not want to remain a member'. The Defence
Minister, Lajos Fur, indicated that the 'Warsaw Pact has lost its earlier
role' and that Hungary 'will leave its military organisation ... by the end of
1991'.1 In fact, by 1990, Hungarian forces had already stopped taking part
in Warsaw Pact (WTO) exercises and other WTO troops were no longer
allowed to conduct manoeuvres on Hungarian territory.
After establishing a new military policy, the most pressing concern of the
new Hungarian government was to disengage from the Warsaw Pact and
from any alliance with the Soviet Armed Forces. The stationing of Soviet
troops in Hungary, as elsewhere in eastern Europe, was previously regulated
through bilateral agreements with the USSR rather than under WTO
arrangements. The first Soviet troops were stationed there in 1944 by the
'right' of a victorious power and later agreements were concluded in 1948
and 1957. Following the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, many Hungarians
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building panels as a way of providing housing in the Union, routine barter
arrangements would have eased the disposal of Soviet military property.3
Failure ro arrange for sufficient sales of movable Soviet property
constituted a major threat to the timetable for withdrawal, since the
Hungarians counted on not having to move to the USSR an estimated 260
trainloads of materials offered for sale. Transfer of Soviet real estate was an
equally perplexing matter, involving sale of abandoned Soviet military
airfields in Debrecen, Kalocsa, Sarmellek, Tokol, Kiskunlachaza and
Csakvar. Under 1990 plans, the Hungarian government had begun this year
to accept bids from foreign interests for the purchase of the airfields. 4
Less significant in legal or political terms, but more disturbing as a threat
to public safety, were the Soviet weapons and ammunition left by
departing troops. In the Somogy district, railroad workers found a mine
that Soviet forces had neglected to load as they withdrew from the area.
Several pieces of ammunition and other explosives were found in
Dombovar following the evacuation of Soviet installations. In the summer
of 1990, there were numerous reports of sales of light machine guns for
90,000 forints each and submachine guns for as little as 3,000 forints.
Ammunition for submachine guns was selling for one forint a round. Even
RPG-7 armour piercing rockets were being offered by Soviet soldiers
seeking a quick profit before their return to the USSR.S
There were often more sophisticated instances of profiteering by
Hungarian officers finding themselves in key positions. According to a
report in June 1990, some field-grade officers formed limited liability
companies using connections made during their service and supplied goods,
including old Soviet equipment, to the Hungarian army without going
through the normal 'open' contract system. In the view of critics,
arrangements such as these prevented competition and gave the suppliers an
unfair advantage in dealing with the military. The flood of Soviet
equipment has exacerbated what many nations had already experienced as a
routine problem in providing for the military's material needs. 6
A final problem associated with Hungary's disengagement from the
Warsaw Pact was the interpretation of legal provisions governing the
Hungarian-Soviet military relationship. Under the agreement on the
stationing of Soviet forces in Hungary, the Soviet Union was to reimburse
the Hungarian state for damages caused by their troops and provide for the
restoration, maintenance and renewal of buildings which they used. This
latter point became a major dispute and was complicated by the fact that
the Russians had constructed buildings without permission and not in
accordance with Hungarian standards. Disposal of the property at the time
threatened negotiations on real estate financial settlements.
Reaction, when Hungarians offered the Soviet authorities only a
fraction of the price demanded for a shop in the Dombovar barracks,
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illustrated the difficulties. The departing Soviet troops demolished the
building rather than sell at what they saw as a very low price. A similar
incident occurred in Komarov-Esztergom, when no agreement could be
reached on the sale of a block of Soviet apartments. Property left behind
was often in a poor and polluted condition. Because of such environmental
hazards, the US Martech Corporation was enlisted in May 1990 to clean
sixty former Soviet installations plagued by severe pollution and unexploded ammunition stored underground.
In June 1990, Defence Minister Lajos Fur outlined the broad framework
for a new policy with his declaration of three basic pillars for Hungarian
security. These are the CSCE all-European security system, regional
cooperation with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and bilateral agreements
with neighbouring states'? Armaments and equipment are already being
changed to reflect the switch of the nation's military stance from an
offensive to a defensive capability.
Hungary's recently announced personnel policies stressed the recruitment at the highest levels of individuals not associated with the country's
old order. The dismissal of Major General Ferenc Szombathelyi in June
1990 illustrated the policy. When questioned about Szombathelyi's forced
retirement, in spite of the fact that there had been no complaints about his
professional service, Defence Minister Fur observed that the Ministry of
Defence wanted to 'symbolise the change in system'. Age has also become
an important factor earlier this year. Officers over 55 were being pensioned.
Of the country's 39 generals in leading posts, 15 were told that they would
be retired due to age. s
The Ministry of Defence, through the Defence Research Institute, has
formulated five specific threat scenarios to meet the country's future
military requirements. According to Colonel Tibor Koszegvari, the
Institute's Director, the scenarios are, first, a natural or industrial disaster;
second, the eruption of a remote armed conflict on the continent that
threatens Hungarian interests; third, the eruption of an armed conflict or a
civil war in a country bordering Hungary and the intrusion onto Hungarian
territory of foreign groups looking for food, fuel or armaments; fourth, a
direct attack on Hungary and, finally, fifth, the eruption of a civil war in
Hungary.9
Defence policy is based on the assumption that the smaller forces will be
capable of dealing with these possible challenges to national security.
Defence spokesmen now recognise that Hungarian fighter planes are
obsolete and that, in view of the costs of modern fighter aircraft, the nation
may be forced to rely on a much more technologically limited force.
Given the Defence Ministry's interest in the territorial defence forces of
Finland and Switzerland, a greater reliance on reserves seems inevitable.
Prime Minister Antall has proposed the formation of a Central-East
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European Union to supplement Hungary's security arrangements. In
Antall's view, the new military or security organisation would be
established along the pattern of the Western European Union. It would be
wi thin the framework of NATO and would serve on an intermediate basis
until the formation of a large institution that would bring NATO states
together with former WTO nations such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia and
Poland. 10
The increasing westernisation of Hungarian military policy has been
reflected in several developments. Probably most dramatic was the
suggestion by the Defence Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly
that a battalion of the Hungarian Armed Forces be sent to join the United
Nations forces in Saudi Arabia. l l Establishment of a formal, diplomatic
relationship with NATO through the office of the Hungarian ambassador
in Brussels is another indication of the direction of the new government's
military policy. Prime Minister AntaH believes that NATO will be a
permanent feature of a new European order and that the Warsaw Pact is
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out.A USSR air army has also left together with missile and engineer units; in all 50,000
serVicemen, or 100,000 Including families, have gone. More than 500000 tons of
military property was shipped, day and night, through the border trans-s]lipment area
near the town of Mandok. About three trains left Hungary for the USSR every day: due
to the smallness of the border railway junction, the troop withdrawal took 11/4 years.
Soviet diVISiOns have been In Hungary since the autumn of 1944.
Magyar Hirlap (Budapest), 5 September 1990, p5. There have been occasional reports of
barter arrangements. For example on 28 July 1990, Nepszabsag reported the delivery of a
wooden house to the Soviet authorities in exchange for a wrecked tank.
Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 22 September 1990, p11.
Magyar Hirlap (Budapest), 24 June 1990, pI and August 14 1990, pI.
Tallozo (Budapest), 29 June 1990, ppI223-1224.
Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 21 June 1990, p5.
Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 21 June 1990, p5 and Magyar Hirlap (Budapest), 19 February
1991, pI.
Ibid, 29 September 1990, p17.
Magyar Hirlap (Budapest), 3 September 1990, p2.
Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 20 September 1990, p4.
Budapest Domestic Service, 22 February 1991, 1100 GMT.

dead.
The establishment of a military intelligence command as an independent
military security organisation was announced in October 1990. In
discussing his new work, Colonel Dr Karoly Gyaraki stressed that, given
the redefinition of European security, Hungary's military security organisation would cooperate with Western intelligence services, especially in
sharing information about international terrorism and drug traffic. The
reported provision of two US F-16 fighter planes for the Hungarian Air
Force was another indication of the government's wish to orient their
military policies towards the west. Technological requirements as well as
considerations of image have been cited by Hungary's military leadership as
reasons for replacing the MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft upon which the air
force is now based.
On 22 February 1991, the Hungarian government announced that 72%
of the Soviet soldiers stationed in Hungary and two thirds of their military
equipment had been withdrawn. 12 This process alone, even at its
conclusion, will not bring the final transformation of Hungarian military
policy. It will set the stage, however, for the reorientation of the nation's
military establishment and a restructuring of the country's military
doctrine. This will happen only as Hungary emerges from an Eastern
Europe dominated by the USSR into an all-European system motivated by
a willingness to put the legacy of the Second World War finally to rest.

A selection of 31 articles by an Army
Quarterly regular contributor. Most
of the pieces have been published
elsewhere, eg in the RUSI Journal
Salisbury Review etc, and cover many
subjects including game-shooting,
Stalingrad, flying, Liddell Hart, the
awful Enoch and hip-operations.

FOOTNOTES

The book can be obtained £8 post
free from The Cromwell Press, 6 Old
North Road, Cromwell, Newark
NG236JE.

1. Nepszabadsag (Budapest) 16 June 1990, pI and June 18 1990, p3.
2. The last Soviet troop train left Hungary on Sunday 16 June 1991. The Southern Group
of Forces (SGF) has now ceased to exist. Two motorised rifle divisions and one armouted
division were withdrawn: a few weeks earlier another armoured division had been pulled
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